Abstract: This study explores how firms respond to changes in product or process architecture. Product or process architecture is the design rules of a system which can be described as the pattern of interrelations between components. Firms must prepare adequate knowledge in a specific architectural condition, so changes of architecture cause serious managerial problems for firms, called modularity traps (or integrity traps). A case study of the optical storage media industry gives some hints for overcoming such traps. First, firms have to alter their strategies and business domains when architectural conditions are changing. That is, in a modularity condition firms have to specialize, and in an integrity condition firms have to coordinate some activities. Second, and more importantly, firms have to retain their component and system knowledge, in order to maintain competitiveness both in specialized activities and in integrated activities.
Architectural change causes serious managerial problems
'Vertical integration to horizontal specialization' has been one of the characteristics of industrial competition since the 1990s. Many firms thought about 'outsourcing' and 'refocusing', to improve competitive performances. In fact, in electronics industries, traditional vertically integrated firms lost competitiveness and networks of specialized firms took over them (Sturgeon, 2002) . In computer industry, specialized firms such as Intel or Microsoft who can make each component of a computer, replaced integrated firms such as IBM (Grove, 1995) .
In semiconductor business, instead of vertical integration, specialization in design (fab-less) and that in manufacturing (foundry) became the dominant form of organization. Architecture is one of the perspectives of artificial systems. 'Artificial' means human-made, and 'system' means composed of more than one component. So an artificial system is a thing that consists of some components made by humans. It includes not only concrete objects, such as automobiles or mobile phones, but also immaterial properties such as economic system or human relations (Simon, 1996) .
'Architecture' as a characteristic of a system can be described as the pattern of interrelations between components (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) . We can distinguish the architecture of systems into two types by the strength of the interdependence of their components: integral and modular. A modular architecture specifies independence (a decoupled structure) of each component. An integral architecture specifies interdependence (a tightly coupled structure) of each component (Ulrich, 1995) .
The automobile, the quality of which is realized by integrating numerous parts, is a typical integral architecture product. On the other hand, the personal computer (PC), whose components, such as the MPU, DRAM, or HDD, are developed and produced independently, is a typical modular architecture product.
Firms must have adequate knowledge and capabilities for their confronting product or process architecture. In other words, different types of knowledge are required in different types of architecture (Ulrich, 1995) . When the system has an integral architecture (consists of tightly coupled subsystems: Simon, 1996) we need mutual coordination and architectural knowledge (knowledge about the system) in order to produce, develop or operate that system. When the system has a modular architecture (consists of nearly decoupled subsystems) we do not need knowledge of the system but we need special, detailed component knowledge (Henderson & Clark, 1990 , Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996 (Figure 1 ).
Because of these relationships, value chain structure can be laid out in accordance with the product or process architecture (Figure 2 ). In integral architecture, a firm should have architectural knowledge, so it will choose a vertically integrated form of organization, whereas in modular architecture the firm should take a specialized form in order to focus its resources on a limited area (Sturgeon, 2002) .
When the architecture changes
Next we will consider changes in the product or process architecture. As we saw in the previous (Fine, 1998) (Demsetz, 1991) , so the alteration of domain would take costs to build or abandon knowledge.
Thus, we can infer that a firm can alter their domains by keeping various kinds of knowledge.
Consider the condition that product architecture goes Whether strategies mentioned above gives firms competitiveness or not will be clear from the case studies.
Research method
This paper is based on one detailed industry case Writable optical storage media, which we analyzed here, are optical media on which information can be written. They are known as 'CD-R' (compact disc-recordable) or 'DVD-R' (digital versatile 1 The research project had been undertaken by five research staffs (including me) at the University of Tokyo. 2 I was helped by Yin (1994) and Fujimoto (2003) in designing the case study.
disc-recordable).
In the case study, we focused on the conditions of process architecture of OSMW industry. We analyzed the process architecture, because the production process of optical storage media is process-intensive, so the industrial structure is affected by process architecture more than product architecture. To make the analysis simple, we picked up three important processes among the whole production processes. I picked out three activities;
'final product production,' 'organic dye production,'
'manufacturing equipment production.' Organic dye is the most important material in making writable optical storage media, because the specifications and the qualities of organic dye mainly decide the lifetime of final product and the precision of data writing. The manufacturing equipment production is also important, as it affects on final product's cost and quality. Furthermore, I added the 'final product sales' into the analytical unit of the case study, because the relationships between production and sales are also the important factor for the settings of industrial structure. The flow of those activities is Yuden's concept of CD-R media business was that 'everyone can make his own original CD at a relatively low price,' so the target of the CD-R was the consumer market. But that plan did not go well.
Sony did not sell CD-R drives actively to consumers because Sony was into music content business too (its target market being also consumers) and felt worried about the negative effect of the CD-R, onto [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] , author (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) which people can copy music, on its music business.
So the CD-R standard did not spread into the consumer market in the early 1990s. In other words, the early CD-R business had no customers. Firms had to find customers other than consumers.
Therefore, the early entrants into the OSMW The market for CD-R media also changed in the late 1990s. From 1997, CD-R drives for personal computers were developed and spread rapidly, as personal computers were being sold all over the 4 Comment by the process engineer of a Japanese OSMW firm.
world. As a result, consumers started to use the CD-R at last. The market changed rapidly from corporate to consumers. In the early 1990s corporate customers bought good quality CD-R media, but in the late 1990s the consumers bought low price CD-Rs with famous brand names on it; they were not so concerned about quality. In addition to such qualitative changes, quantitative change also heavily affected sales activities of the firms. In the past, firms had sold millions of CD-R media, but now they sold from several hundred million to a billion CD-R media. Sales activities needed large administrative functions, marketing professionals and a great distribution network. These capabilities were specialties for sales, so sales activity became functionally independent from production activity. Technological and market changes led to modularity of business activities. All the interactions between activities were no longer needed.
In this modularity phase, specialized firms achieved competitive advantages over vertical ones.
At first, let's look at CD-R production business. As we saw before, everyone can produce CD-R media if he can buy dyes and in-line equipments from the market. So firms cannot get competitive advantage by possessing their own organic dye division or manufacturing equipment division. In addition, consumers as customers did not want differentiated CD-Rs but cheap ones, so production activity did not need integration between materials and equipments.
Firms needed to focus their resources on CD-R manufacturing activity. Taiwanese CMC and Ritek took this strategy and got a total share of more than 70% in total production of CD-R. They entered the OSMW industry around 1996 by focusing on CD-R production. They exploited the Taiwanese stock exchange market and obtained a large amount of capital, and they invested it only in building CD-R manufacturing capacities larger than those of the existing firms. These huge investments on production capacities gave them economies of scale. On the other hand, the relationships between production and sales did not change drastically.
Though users want quality more than low cost, 
Discussion and conclusion
In the previous section, we observed the OSMW industry from a process architecture perspective.
And we confirmed that the changes in process architecture drove changes in the value chain structure. In the early 1990s process architecture was integral and firms had vertical integrated forms. Finally the contributions of this paper will be discussed. This paper's novelty exists in its dynamic view of competition. Past research has suggested strategies in modularity (Baldwin & Clark, 2000 , Sturgeon, 2002 and those in integrity (Takeishi, 2003) . But there has been little research on how to compete when the architecture changes. Kusunoki and Chesbrough (2001) and Fine (1998) dealt with the dynamics of architecture, but they did not reach a solution to it. This paper has tried to find out how to compete in the change of the architecture. I consider this the main contribution of this study.
Some researchers have already reached the conclusion that knowledge should be kept widely regardless of the domain of a firm's business (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001; Takeishi, 2003) . Those researches insisted that knowledge wideness is important from static analysis. This paper extends the discussion from static to dynamic. That is, here we insist that to keep knowledge leads to competitiveness in a dynamic changing environment.
In such turbulent environments, firms have to achieve strategic flexibility in order to respond to the changes (D'Aveni, 1994) . From this study, we can say that keeping knowledge would be one of the
